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Résumé: Cet article montre que des distributeurs peuvent décider d'offrir des produits 
différenciés, non pas pour relâcher la concurrence horizontale, mais pour 
accroître leur pouvoir d'achat vis-à-vis de leur fournisseur. Nous analysons un 
modèle simple où deux producteurs offrent des produits différenciés en qualité à 
deux distributeurs en activité sur des marches séparés qui ne peuvent offrir 
qu'un seul produit aux consommateurs. A la première étape du jeu, les 
distributeurs choisissent quel produit mettre en rayon, puis chaque distributeur 
et son fournisseur négocient sur un contrat de tarif binôme. Enfin, les 
distributeurs choisissent leur quantités. Lorsque les coûts de production sont 
convexes, la part des profits joint revenant au distributeur est plus élevée lorsque 
les distributeurs choisissent de se différencier. L'origine de la différenciation peut 
donc être uniquement liée au désir des distributeurs d'accroître leur pouvoir 
d'achat: via la différenciation des fournisseurs, le distributeur obtient une plus 
large part de profits joints plus faibles. Ce résultat est robuste lorsque l'on 
introduit de la concurrence en aval. Nous mettons en évidence les conséquences 
de cette stratégie de différenciation sur le surplus des consommateurs. 
 
Abstract: This paper shows that retailers may choose to offer products differentiated in 
quality, not to relax downstream competition, but to improve their buyer power 
in the negotiation with their supplier. We consider a simple vertical industry 
where two producers sell products differentiated in quality to two retailers who 
operate in separated markets. In the game, first retailers choose which product to 
carry, then each retailer and her chosen producer bargain over the terms of a 
two-part tariff contract and retailers finally choose the quantities. When 
upstream production costs are convex, the share of the total profits going to the 
retailer would be higher if they choose to differentiate. We thus isolate the wish 
to differentiate as "only" due to increasing buyer power: via producer's 
differentiation, the retailer gets a larger share of smaller total profits. This result 
also holds when retailers compete downstream. We derive the consequences of a 
differentiation induced by buyer power motives for consumer surplus. 
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1 Introduction
The retail sector underwent major changes in Europe and in the United
States in the last thirty years. In particular, successive merger waves have
led to the constitution of large international retail groups: in 2002 nearly
30% of the 200 top world retailers’ sales turnover was realized by the top
first ten retailers, among which were the American Wal-Mart and the French
Carrefour.1
The issue of the potential and current increase in the buyer power of large re-
tailers was raised simultaneously by industry participants, the media,2, and
by the Competition authorities in general.3 Competition authorities took
into account the retailers’ buyer power in their analysis, either as an ele-
ment of countervailing power in the cases of mergers between producers, or
as a potential threat to competition. For instance, some merger proposals
between the retailers Rewe/Meinl and Carrefour/Promodes, were authorized
by the European Commission, only after the merging parties had commit-
ted themselves to maintain their relationships with a group of particularly
exposed suppliers. Recent reports of the OECD4, the OFT5 or consulting
groups6 document the degree of and state of buyer power in the retail sector
across countries and the issues that arise.
Retailers’ buyer power has been the subject of a recent Industrial Organi-
zation literature, both empirical and theoretical, which raises in particular
the question of its measurement, its origins and its consequences for social
welfare (Inderst and Mazzarotto (2006)).
Among the consequences of buyer power, most articles have focused on the
1Deloitte, 2004 Global Powers of Retailing.
2Lynn, B. C., 2006. ”Breaking the Chain: The Antitrust Case Against Wal-mart”,
www.Harpers.org, July 31, 2006.
3Schelings, R. and Wright J., “‘Sui Generis’?: An Antitrust Analysis of Buyer Power
in the Unites States and European Union”, Law and Economics Working Paper series,
Georges Mason University School of Law; EC, 1999;
“Buyer power and its impact on competition in the food retail distribution sector of the
European Union”. DG IV. Brussels.
4OCDE, ( 1999), “Buying Power and Multiproduct Retailers”, series of round tables
on Competition Policy DAFFE/CLP, 21.
5“The Welfare Consequences of the Exercise of Buyer Power”, Dobson and al. OFT
Report, 1998.
6“Buyer Power in Post-Merger Markets, The Efficiency Defense and Merger Simula-
tion”, PWC Economics Competition, Spring 2005.
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countervailing power effect, a concept introduced by Galbraith in 1952. Gal-
braith argued that the increasing buyer power of concentrated retailers could
allow then to obtain better conditions from their suppliers and thus to lower
their costs. A large literature has been devoted to determining the framework
under which a countervailing power effect may indeed be relevant.
Another important issue is that of the “non-price” effects of buyer power.
Our paper fits directly in these recent developments by raising the question of
the implications of the retailers’ buyer power on the assortment of products
which they offer to the consumers. In other words, our main issue is to
understand the consequences of retailers’ buyer power on the variety, or on
the quality, of the products which they put in their shelves.
The main argument of this paper is developed in a simple framework where
two symmetric non-competing retailers, being each a monopolist on down-
stream separated markets, have to choose in a first stage, which product
to carry in their shelves. There are two products differentiated in quality
and offered by different manufacturers and the retailers are capacity (shelf)
constrained, and do indeed offer only one product. In a second stage, each
retailer and her chosen producer simultaneously bargain over a two-part tar-
iff contract and finally retailers choose the quantity of products to sell on the
final market. In this context, we show that the retailers may choose to offer
products differentiated in quality to the consumers. The differentiation does
not aim at relaxing downstream competition between them - since we have
assumed that retailers were not competing - but at improving their buyer
power in their negotiation with their supplier.7 Indeed, when production
cost are convex the greater the number of retailers he deals with the greater
the share of joint profits the producer is able to capture. A direct conse-
quence is that retailers’ buyer power may be raised thanks to the supplier’s
differentiation. Moreover, we show that there are cases that, by choosing the
low quality product, the total joint profits to be shared are lower than if the
retailer stuck to the high quality product the other retailer lists, but he is
7The IO literature devoted to the analysis of producer and retailer relationships tradi-
tionally refers to the principal-agent paradigm. The producer (principal) offers a take-it
or leave-it contract to the retailer (agent). In this framework, the buyer power is limited
to the retailer’s ability to refuse the contract. Recent works on buyer power rather use
the bargaining theory and assume that producer and retailer bargain over their contract
(see for example Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003)). The balance of power between producer
and retailer depends on the respective status-quo profits of the parties, i.e their outside
option profits.
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still able to extract a bigger share of those smaller profits. In doing so, we are
able to isolate a wish to differentiate as “only” due to increasing buyer power
(increasing the share of the “pie”). When differentiation occurs it harms not
only the consumers surplus of those who buy the product of lower quality,
but can also prove to be harmful for social welfare overall.
Several articles are devoted to the consequences of the balance of power
between producers and retailers on retailers’ listing strategy and thus are
directly related to our work. Avenel and Caprice (2006) show how a high
quality producer may have an incentive to offer different contracts to sym-
metric competing retailers in order that the latter specialize their offer: one
of the retailers offers the high quality product while her competitor offers a
low quality good supplied by a competitive fringe. This listing choice special-
ization is imposed by the producer, when his market power is high enough, to
improve his profits thanks to the downstream competition relaxation effect.
Shaffer (2005) highlights the adverse effect of slotting allowances competition
between producers on retailer’s listing choice. A producer may offer slotting
allowances to secure his patronage in retailers’ shelves when the latter are
capacity constrained (each retailer can only store one product while two prod-
ucts are available in the market) to the detriment of another product offered
by a competitive fringe. This strategy may thus harm consumer surplus.
The paper by Inderst and Shaffer (2005) is also closely related to our work.
They identify a new mechanism through which a horizontal merger between
retailers can increase retailer’s buyer power. Before the merger, retailers are
on separated markets and buy from two different manufacturers. After the
merger, the new consolidated retailer may commit to a single sourcing strat-
egy in order to increase her buyer power. Finally, Chen (2006) shows that
when a retailer may choose the number of products’ variety she puts in her
shelves (without capacity constraint) and bears a constant retail cost, her
countervailing power lowers consumer prices but reduces product diversity.
On the one hand, the monopoly distortion in price is reduced but on the
other hand, the distortion in terms of variety of products is increased and
consumers are always worse off.
This paper also sheds light into the theory of product differentiation (An-
derson, De Palma and Thisse (1992) ) showing that buyer power can be a
source of differentiation. This idea has to our knowledge not been previ-
ously explored and researched in the literature. Differentiation itself is not
unambiguously welfare improving or welfare reducing. Consumers may ben-
efit from the availability of a wide variety of product offerings to serve their
3
differing preferences. Yet differentiation can also facilitate the exercise of
market power. The producer (or retailer) who offers a differentiated prod-
uct often enjoys a localized monopoly and may be able to charge a higher
price than it otherwise could. While our theoretical argument is developed
initially in a context where the retailers are not directly competing in the
downstream markets, we show that it also holds when the retailers compete
in the same market. Within this context, supplier’s differentiation may be
an optimal strategy for the retailers to improve their buyer power but also,
as an indirect effect, relax downstream competition. The welfare effects are
thus more complex, and in particular, we show that when competition is
strong enough, the total welfare effect may be positive.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the model, section
3 sets up the situation for separate retail markets and section 4 extends the
results to imperfectly competing retail markets. Section 5 concludes and
discusses implications of the results.
2 The model
We assume that there are two manufacturers offering vertically differenti-
ated products K = {H,L}, where H is of quality h and L is of quality l, and
we assume that the quality l is strictly less than h. For simplicity, let assume
that both manufacturers have exactly the same cost function C(q)8. Thus,
if producer H is able to produce a higher quality good it may be explained
for example by a higher reputation collected in the past (thanks to sunk
cost). One can consider here, for instance, that H is the first national brand
producer while L would be the second national brand producer. We simply
assume that C ′(q) > 0 and we’ll derive our results according to different
shapes of this cost function.
Manufacturers cannot sell their product directly to consumers but can do it
through retailers. There are two retailers and we will analyze successively the
case where each retailer is a monopolist on her market, and the case where
the two retailers compete in the same market. As shelf space is limited, we
assume that each retailer can carry only one product while there are two
8We can assume that the production cost of the low quality product is less than the
production cost of the high quality good without changing qualitatively our results.
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products available.9 Let the subscript i = 1, 2 denote the retailer and the
superscript K = {H,L} denote the product sold.
Consumer’s demand for good K at retailer i increases with the level of qual-
ity k and decreases in its price denoted pKi . We use the original vertical
differentiation model of Mussa and Rosen (1978) where consumers have a
marginal willingness to pay for quality θ, and we assume that this parameter
is distributed according to a density f (θ) on an interval [0, θ]. The size of
the market is normalized to 1 without loss of generality. We also assume
that each consumer buys at most one unit of the good. The surplus a θ-type
consumer withdraws from its consumption at the price pKi is S (θ) = θk−pKi .
Consumers buy the good as long as S (θ) ≥ 0.
In this setting, we consider the following simple game :
Stage 1: Each retailer chooses which product K to carry on his shelf;
Stage 2 : Each retailer bargains with his chosen manufacturer on a two-part
tariff contract (wKi , T
K
i ) where w
K
i is the price paid per unit of good and T
K
i
is a fixed tariff independent of the quantity of the good.
Stage 3: Retailers choose their final quantity qKi
10.
The main assumption of this game is the ability of retailers to commit in
the first stage on their listing choice. This hypothesis is close to Scott-
Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) and differs from other works such as Avenel
and Caprice (2006) or Shaffer (2005). The latter papers consider that all
potential producers rather compete ex-ante for the limited shelf space by
offering slotting allowances to the retailers, so all producers and retailers
9For example, consider the case of a product with a certain facing width, and the shelf
space only allows one facing of a product to be visible in the shelf, while additional units of
the same product can be stored behind the facing. The restriction that retailers only carry
one product is a simplifying assumption. The results would also hold for the case when
retailers can carry a fixed number M of products in the shelf, where there are N > M
products available at the manufacturer level.
10The alternative assumption where retailers set their price pKi in the last stage wouldn’t
change the results when retailers are in separated markets. We discuss the role of this
assumption in the section devoted to retail competition.
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are relevant. Our assumption allows only a certain set of retailers to be
relevant for certain producers, because retailers already commit to carry
certain products ex-ante. We thus implicitly assume that their is a sunk
fixed cost per negotiation for retailers sufficiently high to deter retailers to
enter in a bargaining process with all suppliers whereas they finally only sell
one product.
The bargaining in the second stage follows the Nash (1950) bargaining pro-
cess and in the case where both retailers carry the same product in their
shelves, we use the contract equilibrium concept developed by O’Brien and
Shaffer (1992). Contracts are negotiated secretly between each pair (K, i)
and while negotiating, K and i have passive conjectures: they take the other
pair’s terms of the negotiation
(
wKj , T
K
j
)
as given. The contracts resulting
from these assumptions are thus resistant to any pairwise deviation. Mul-
tilateral deviations are excluded.11. We determine in section 3 equilibria of
the game when each retailer is a monopoly on her downstream market and
then introduce retail competition in section 4.
3 Each retailer is a monopoly in her down-
stream market
In this section, each retailer is a downstream monopolist in his market.
Retailer i’s inverse demand function is PKi (q
K
i ) if he carries the good K of
quality k where qKi is the quantity offered. We denote the vertical bilateral
joint profits for the sales by retailer i of a quantity qKi of goodK as Υ
K
i
(
qKi
)
=
PKi (q
K
i )q
K
i − C(qKi ). We assume that ΥLi
(
qLi
)
strictly increases in l.12 We
solve the game backwards.
3.1 The quantity choice
As each retailer is a monopolist in her market, her demand is as follows.
Consumers buy the good as long as S (θ) ≥ 0 and thus the total demand for
11However, multilateral deviations would only occur in a price setting (See Rey and
Verge´ (2002))
12This assumption is verified by a wide class of distribution functions F (θ).
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good K is qKi =
∫ θ
pK
i
k
f(θ)dθ. Let PKi
(
qKi
)
denote the corresponding inverse
demand function for good K at retailer i.
In the last stage of the game, retailer i, who carries the good K, chooses the
quantity qKi that maximizes her profit taking as given her own two-part tariff
(wKi , T
K
i ) negotiated in stage 2. Retailer i’s profit is:
piKi = (P
K
i
(
qKi
)− wKi )qKi − TKi (1)
We assume that piKi is concave in q
K
i . Retailer i’s optimal quantity choice is
denoted qK∗i (.) .
As both retailers are in separated markets, the optimal quantity choice of a
retailer in the last stage is independent of the quantity chosen by the other
retailer. In the second stage, the bargaining takes place and there are two
cases to consider according to retailers’ listing choices in the first stage. The
two listing structures are denoted {K,K} and {K,−K}.
3.2 The bargaining game
3.2.1 Case {K,−K}
In this case, retailers supply from different manufacturers, and since they
are in separated markets, the two negotiations are completely independent
from one another.
K and i bargain over a two-part tariff contract (wKi , T
K
i ). We denote Π
K
i the
profit realized by the manufacturer K who supplies the retailer i through a
contract (wKi , T
K
i ): Π
K
i = w
K
i q
K
i + T
K
i − C(qKi ). The equilibrium two-part
tariff (ŵKi , T̂
K
i ) is the solution of the following Nash program:
Max
wKi ,T
K
i
(ΠKi )
1−α(piKi )
α (2)
where α ∈ ]0, 1[ is a parameter describing the exogenous buyer power of
retailers. Results being independent of the value of α within the interval
]0, 1[, we henceforth assume that parties have equal exogenous bargaining
power: α = 1
2
. Solving the FOCs, we find that the optimal wholesale price
is equal to the marginal cost of production and thus maximize bilateral joint
profits. Thus the equilibrium wholesale price is defined by the following
implicit function: ŵKi =
∂C(qKi )
qKi
∣∣∣
qKi =q
K∗
i ( bwKi ) .
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The equilibrium transfer is such that the retailer and the manufacturer cap-
tures exactly an equal share of the joint profits :
T̂Ki =
1
2
P (qK∗i )q
K∗
i − ŵKi qK∗i +
1
2
C(qK∗i ) (3)
Lemma 1 Whatever the cost function, when retailers carry differentiated
products, each retailer (resp. the manufacturer ) captures a share 1
2
of the
bilateral joint profits.
Proof. Straightforward from (3).
The Nash program insures that first, the size of the pie is maximum, it is here
equal to the monopoly profit, and second, that the pie is shared according
to the exogenous bargaining power, here 1
2
.
3.2.2 Case {K,K}
The two retailers bargain with the same supplier. Negotiations are no
longer independent from one another since the producer K now has a status-
quo in his bargaining towards each retailer: in case of a breach in the bar-
gaining betweenK and i, K realizes a positive profit with the other retailer j.
However, we have assumed that contracts are negotiated simultaneously and
secretly. While a pair (K, i) negotiates, she considers the terms (wKj , T
K
j ) of
the other pair’s negotiation as given. Moreover, if the bargaining of the pair
(K, i) fails, the other pair (K, j) would not be aware of it before her own
bargaining is over13.
The Nash program of the negotiation between K and i may thus be written
as follows:
Max
wKi ,T
K
i
(ΠKi+j − ΠKj )
1
2 (piKi )
1
2 (4)
where ΠKi+j = w
K
i q
K
i + T
K
i + w
K
j q
K
j + T
K
j − C(qKi + qKj ) and ΠKj = wKj qKj +
TKj − C(qKj ).
From the FOCs and from the symmetry between markets, the optimal input
prices wK∗i are equal to the marginal costs of production which maximize
13Thus everything happens as if the producer K had simultaneously sent two agents to
bargain with each of the retailers and if those agents couldn’t communicate while they
bargain.
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bilateral joints profits. Thus, wK∗i is defined in equilibrium by w
K∗
i = w
K∗
j
and the following implicit function:
wK∗i =
∂C(qKi + q
K
j )
∂qKi
∣∣∣∣∣
(qKi ∗(wK∗i ),qK∗j (wK∗j ))
(5)
Here, the optimal tariff now shares the joint profits depending on the pro-
ducer’s status-quo. The lower the incremental profit the producer obtains
thanks to his relationships with i, the higher the tariff paid by the retailer
to the producer.
The equilibrium tariff is:
TK∗i =
1
2
P (qK∗i )q
K∗
i − wK∗i qK∗i +
1
2
(C(qK∗i + q
K∗
j )− C(qK∗j )) (6)
We thus analyze three sub-cases:
(1) When the cost function is linear (C ′′(q) = 0), since qK∗j = q
K∗
i , the equi-
librium tariff is:
TK1∗i =
1
2
P (qK∗i )q
K∗
i − wK∗i qK∗i +
1
2
C(qK∗i ) (7)
Here, the retailer and the producer captures a half of their joint profits. The
equilibrium expression TK1∗i is indeed exactly equivalent to T̂
K
i .
(2) When the cost function is concave (C ′′(q) < 0), the equilibrium tariff
TK2∗i is strictly lower than in the linear cost case: T
K2∗
i < T
K1∗
i . Here, the
retailer captures a share of his joint profits δ > 1
2
.
(3) When the cost function is convex (C ′′(q) > 0), the equilibrium tariff TK3∗i
is always higher than in the linear cost case: TK3∗i > T
K1∗
i . In that case, the
retailer captures a share of his joint profits with the manufacturer γ < 1
2
.
We thus obtain our first proposition:
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Proposition 2 If the upstream cost functions are convex, and if retailers
can commit on which product they carry before the negotiation takes place, a
retailer increases her buyer power in carrying a differentiated product.
Proof. Straightforward from (6)
The insight for this result is as follows. Each retailer bargains with the pro-
ducer at the margin. Thus, if the producer has a convex cost function, the
quantity bought by each of the two retailers induces a higher marginal pro-
duction cost than the marginal cost a single retailer’s order would induce.
The convexity of costs here insures that the greater the number of retailers
he bargains with, the greater the producer’s bargaining power. Conversely,
when cost are convex, retailers have a greater buyer power when they supply
towards differentiated producers. Inderst and Wey (2003) have previously
shown that, in another context, the convexity of cost may also explain why
a larger buyer has a greater bargaining power towards a producer than a
smaller buyer. A larger buyer who buys a greater quantity of good, induces
on average a smaller incremental production cost than the smaller quantity
bought by a smaller size buyer. Chemla (2003) has also shown how an up-
stream monopoly, who can choose and commit on the number of retailers he
supplies, could have a greater seller power in dealing with multiple retailers.
His result relies on the same mechanism: the producer incurs a fix cost per
retailer that is strictly increasing with the number of retailers. The latter
cost convexity is due to agency costs in an incomplete contract environment
rather than to the production function, but the basic insight is the same.
3.3 Optimal listing choice
First of all, note that since both manufacturers have the same cost function
and since retailers can, in our simple demand framework, always extract
a higher surplus from consumers by selling the high quality product, it is
straightforward that there is no equilibrium where the two retailers would
choose to carry L. It is always optimal, at least for one of the two retailers,
to sell H. Then, the question is whether or not it is a best response for the
other retailer to also carry H or to carry L.14
14Alternatively, we could consider that the manufacturer L can enter the market without
cost and does not enter the market unless he is listed by a retailer (unless he has an order).
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In this section, and for simplicity, we consider that the retailer 1 has chosen
to carry H, and we analyze the best reply of retailer 2. Let ΥH∗2 denote the
optimal joint profits between the retailer 2 and the producer H and, Υ̂L2 , the
joint profits between L and 2.
We analyze successively the case where the cost function is linear, concave
and convex.
1−Linear cost function
In this case we know, from the previous section, that retailer 2 captures half
of her joint profits with the producer whatever her listing choice. Finally,
her choice only depends on the comparison of joint profits the retailer can
realize with each of the producer. Since the cost functions are identical and
linear, we have ΥH∗2 > Υ̂
L
2 . Thus, the retailer 2 always chooses to carry H.
2−Concave cost function
In this case, and from the previous section, the retailer 2 obtains a share
δ > 1
2
of her joint profits with the producer when she carries also the product
H and a share 1
2
when she carries the differentiated product L. Moreover,
since the cost function is concave the marginal cost of production of the
producer H is lowered when the two retailers carry his product rather than
when 2 carries L : Υ̂L2 < Υ
H∗
2 . Thus, the retailer 2 realizes strictly higher
joint profits carrying H than L. As piL2 =
bΥL2
2
< piH∗2 = δΥ
H∗
2 , the retailer 2
always chooses to carry H.
3−Convex cost function
If the cost function is convex, the retailer captures a share γ < 1
2
of her joint
profits when she also carries H, piL2 =
bΥL2
2
, and a share 1
2
if she carries L,
piH∗2 = γΥ
H∗
2 . We also know that, since the cost function is convex, the joint
profits realized with L can now be higher than the joint profits realized with
H.
To compare those profits, we first compare the two joint profits. More pre-
cisely, in the extreme case where l = 0, Υ̂L2 = 0 and at the other extreme,
11
if l = h, Υ̂L2 > Υ
H∗
2 .
15 By definition Υ̂L2 strictly increases with the quality
of the product l, thus, there exists a unique threshold l ∈ ]0, 1[ such that if
l ∈ ]l, 1], the joint profits when the retailer carries L is strictly higher than
joint profits if the retailer carries H also.
We now focus on the interval of qualities where l ∈ [0, l] where Υ̂L2 ≤ ΥH∗2 .
In l = l, by definition Υ̂L2
(
l
)
= ΥH∗2 and since the retailer has a lower
share of the joint profits when she carries H, we have: piH∗2 < pi
L
2
(
l
)
. Since
Υ̂L2 (0) = 0 and Υ̂
L
2 (l) is by assumption strictly increasing in l, there exists a
unique threshold l˜ ∈ ]0, l[ such that retailer 2 realizes a better profit choosing
to carry L when l > l˜ and to carry H when l ≤ l˜.
The above discussion leads us to the following lemma:
Lemma 3 When C ′′(q) ≤ 0, the only Nash equilibrium of the game is
{H,H}. When C ′′(q) > 0, there is a threshold l˜ such that when l[l˜, 1],
the unique Nash equilibrium of the game is {H,L}.
Proof. See appendix 6.1.1.
A retailer renounces to carry the high quality product to the benefit of a
second brand only if the quality of the latter is high enough. This result
translates well that, when a first national brand has a very strong brand, it
is less likely that the retailer renounces to carry it in her shelves.
In the interval of qualities [l, 1], the retailer 2 sells L rather than H and two
reasons explain her choice: (1) to raise her buyer power and (2) to increase
her joint profits with the producer thanks to the reduction of her marginal
cost. Both effects are derived from the convexity of costs. Thus {H,L} is the
unique Nash equilibrium of the game when l > l.
In the interval of qualities [l˜, l], joint profits are smaller and the only motiva-
tion for 2 to carry L on her shelves rather than H is that, in supplying from
a producer who has no alternative outlet on equilibrium, she has a greater
buyer power. This result is interesting and allows us to highlight another
source of product differentiation that relies on buyer power: the producer’s
differentiation. Here, retailers do not carry differentiated products in their
shelves to relax retail competition since each retailer is a monopolist in her
downstream market.
We thus obtain the following proposition:
15See detailed proof in appendix 6.1.1.
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Proposition 4 Non competing retailers may choose producer’s differentia-
tion only with the purpose to increase their buyer power.
Proof. Straightforward since Υ̂L2 ≤ ΥH∗2 when l[l˜, l].
As we previously announced the above result holds for any value of the
retailer’s exogenous bargaining power α ∈ ]0, 1[ . However, results would be
changed in the extreme case where one of the parties has all the power. If
α = 0, since producers capture the entire surplus of their relationships with
the retailers, retailers are indifferent in their listing choice and both {H,L}
and {H,H} are equilibria of the game. If α = 1, retailers capture the entire
surplus of their relationships with the producer, the listing choice is realized
only through the comparison of the retailer 2 joint profits selling either H or
L and only the threshold l is relevant.
If we now look at the consumer surplus, the choice by 2 to carry the
product L on her shelves has different consequences according to the market
considered. For consumers located in retailer 1’s market, the effect is strictly
fruitful: because of cost convexity, H’s marginal cost of production is lowered
when 2 renounces to carry also the product H, which allows 1 to sell a greater
quantity of goodH at a lower price. For the retailer 2’s consumers, the effects
are more complex. On the one hand, the lowering in marginal cost also has
a positive effect for consumers since it tends to lower prices, but on the other
hand, the downgrading in quality is clearly harmful. The total effect depends
on the definition of both f(θ) and C(q). Therefore, we briefly derive in the
next subsection an illustrative example with a quadratic cost function and a
uniform distribution function of consumers’ tastes, and analyze more closely
the consequences of our results in terms of consumer surplus and welfare.
3.4 Illustrative example
Let the high quality parameter be normalized to h = 1 while the low quality
l varies in the interval [0, 1]. The parameter θ is assumed to be uniformly
distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Therefore, the inverse demand for the good
K of quality k is: PKi = k
(
1− qKi
)
To focus on the most interesting case, let the cost function be convex and
defined by the following equation: C(q) = cq
2
2
,where c > 0. The parameter
c is degree of cost’s convexity. In this example, we always have piKi concave
and ΥKi strictly increases in k. Solving the game, we obtain the following
equilibrium and corresponding profits.
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3.4.1 The two retailers carry H
To find the solution of the game, we apply previous general approach.
The equilibrium contract is wK∗i =
c
1+c
and TK∗i =
2−c
16(1+c)2
for i = 1, 2.
The wholesale price increases with c while the tariff decreases in c. This is
straightforward as total cost and marginal cost strictly increase with c. Final
prices and quantities, pK∗i =
1+2c
2(1+c)
and qK∗i
(
wK∗i
)
= 1
2(1+c)
for i = 1, 2, are
respectively increasing and decreasing in c. Corresponding retailers’ profits
are
piK∗i =
2+c
16(1+c)2
for i = 1, 2 and strictly decrease with the level of cost c.
The profit of the producer K and consumer surplus in that case are naturally
both decreasing in c: ΠK∗ = 2+3c
8(1+c)2
and S∗ = 1+2c
4(1+c)2
.
The share of the joint profits with the producer the retailer captures γ =
2+c
4(1+c)
< 1
2
and (γ) strictly decreases with c. As we proved in the previous
section, the source of the producer’s power in his bargaining with each retailer
is linked to the difference between his profit and his status-quo profit. This
difference decreases when the difference of costs C
(
2qKi
)−C (qKi ) increases,
i.e as the convexity of cost rises. As c increases, it lowers the difference of
profit a producer can realize with and without a retailer, and thus increases
his bargaining power within the relationship towards i. On the contrary, the
share of joint profits the retailer captures decreases with the level of cost c.
3.4.2 One retailer carries L
The equilibrium contract is ŵH1 =
c
2+c
and T̂H1 =
2−c
4(2+c)2
between H and
1 and ŵL2 =
cl
2l+c
and T̂L12 =
(2l−c)l2
4(2l+c)2
between 2 and L. Retail prices and
quantities are p̂H1 =
1+c
2+c
and p̂L2 =
l(c+l)
2l+c
, qH∗1
(
ŵH1
)
= 1
2+c
and qL∗2
(
ŵL2
)
=
l
2l+c
. Corresponding retailers profits are piH1 =
1
4(2+c)
and piL2 =
l2
4(c+2l)
. In this
example, our main assumption is always true: Υ̂L2 (l) strictly increases in l.
Finally, the profit of the two producers and consumer surplus in this case
are : Π̂H = 1
4(2+c)
and Π̂L = l
2
4(c+2l)
, Ŝ = 1
2
(
1+c
(2+c)2
+ l
2(c+l)
(c+2l)2
)
. The latter
equilibrium outcome values are all strictly increasing in l. Here, and as we
proved in the general case, a retailer simply captures a half of her joint profits
with the producer.
14
3.4.3 Comparison
In this illustrative example, we assume, as in the general case, that the
retailer 1 has chosen to carry H in her shelves and we analyze the best
response strategy for the retailer 2.
We represent in Figure 1 the different thresholds l and l˜ defined in the gen-
eral case. In this example the corresponding thresholds are functions of the
parameter c. We also represent a threshold ls (resp. ls2 such that if l > ls
(resp. l > ls2, the producers’ differentiation increases the sum of consumers’
surplus in both markets (resp. retailer 2’s market consumers’ surplus).
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
cl (c )
2sl
sl
l
l~
Figure 1: Thresholds
Note first that all the thresholds strictly decrease with c since the benefit
of a producers’ differentiation increases with the cost convexity, either for
retailers, the vertical industry or the consumers16. In the shaded area, the
retailer chooses to supply from the low quality producer only in order to
16The exact formula for all the quality thresholds are provided in appendix 6.1.2.
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improve her buyer power since l ∈ [l˜, l]. Moreover, in the same area, this
strategy is always damaging for consumer surplus since l < ls. When c is low
enough, i.e at the left of the vertical dotted line, a differentiation induced by
a buyer power concern can only have negative effects on consumer surplus
regardless of l. We thus obtain the following remark.
Corollary 5 The producer’s differentiation may damage consumer surplus
for low degree of convexity in the cost function.
Proof. see appendix 6.1.2.
For sufficiently low values of the parameter c, the damages for consumers on
market 2 surpass the benefits for consumers on market 1. It is clear that, at
a given level of quality l, the negative effect of 2 carrying L for the market 2
consumers is reduced as the convexity of cost is raised. On the other hand,
the benefits of 2 carrying L for the consumers in market 1 strictly increases
with cost convexity. The total effect on surplus will thus be negative if the
convexity of costs is not too strong.
4 Retail competition
In this section we assume that the two retailers compete in the same mar-
ket of size 1. In this new framework, retailers also have the usual motivation
for product differentiation to relax downstream competition. It is straight-
forward that the only Nash equilibrium of the game in a perfect competi-
tion setting would be for retailers to offer differentiated products. We thus
adopt an imperfect competition setting assuming that retailers compete a` la
Cournot. We keep the general notations adopted in section 3 except that
for simplicity, we assume from the start that if the two retailers list different
products, 1 offers H and 2 offers L. The game is solved backwards.
4.1 The quantity choice
Consumers’ demand differs according to the listing structure {H,L} or
{H,H}. The superscript S = {HH,HL} henceforth refers to the listing
structure considered.
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4.1.1 Case {H,H}
Consumers buy the good H as long as S (θ) ≥ 0 and thus the total demand
for good H is QHH =
∫ θ
pK
i
k
f(θ)dθ. Let PHH
(
QHH
)
denote the corresponding
inverse demand function for good H on the market. In equilibrium, the total
supply equals demand such that, QHH =
∑
i
qHHi .
In the last stage of the game, retailer i chooses her quantity qHHi that maxi-
mizes her profit given the tariff she has negotiated in stage 2 and considering
her rival’s quantity as given. Optimal Cournot quantities are denoted by
qHH∗1 (.) and q
HH∗
2 (.).
4.1.2 Case {H,L}
The consumer θ now compares his surplus if he buys the product H,
SH (θ) = θh − PH1 , or the product L, SL (θ) = θl − PL2 . The indifferent
consumer between buying H or L has a type θ˜ =
PH1 −PL2
h−l . The total demand
for good H at retailer 1 is thus qH1 =
∫ θeθ f(θ)dθ and the total demand for
good L at retailer 2 is thus qL2 =
∫ eθ
PL2
l
f(θ)dθ. Let PH1
(
qH1 , q
L
2
)
and PL2
(
qH1 , q
L
2
)
denote the corresponding inverse demand functions.
In stage 3, each retailer chooses the quantity that maximizes her profit given
the tariff she has negotiated in stage 2 and taking as given the quantity sold
by her rival. Optimal Cournot quantities are denoted q̂HL1 (.) and q̂
HL
2 (.).
4.2 The bargaining game
In a competition framework, secret contracts may give rise to secret dis-
counting which raises a commitment inefficiency (see Hart and Tirole (1990),
O’Brien and Shaffer (1992), McAfee and Schwartz (1994)). The latter inef-
ficiency is discussed further when solving the subgame when H serves both
retailers. In addition to the general assumption on secrecy of contracts we
assume here that contracts are not observable ex-post.17 It means that the
17Choosing the alternative assumption of ex-post observability, would raise a new coor-
dination problem in the vertical chain. A retailer and her supplier would have an incentive
to bargain over a contract with a marginal part undercutting the contract bargained by
her rival to give her an advantage over her rival in the competition stage: The equilibrium
wholesale prices would then be set below the marginal cost. Bonnano and Vickers (1987)
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contract terms between H and 1 are not observed by 2 before the latter
chooses his quantity in stage 3. Technically, a pair (K, i) bargains taking
into account the quantity chosen by the other retailer j in stage 3 as given.
This assumption was pointless in section 3 since retailers were not competing
and thus had no incentive to change their quantity choice in the last stage
according to the contract bargained by the other retailer.
4.2.1 Case {H,L}
In that case, retailers supply towards different manufacturers, but since
they now compete, the two negotiations could be related through the quantity
choice. However, due to our assumptions on secrecy of contracts, negotiations
remain independent from one another.
Solving the Nash program, we find that the optimal input price is chosen
in order to maximize joint profits and thus equal to the marginal cost of
production.
Lemma 6 Whatever the cost function, when retailers carry differentiated
products, the manufacturer (resp. each retailer) captures a share 1
2
of the
bilateral joint profits.
Proof. See appendix 6.2.1
With retail competition, as in the separated markets case, when they supply
towards different producers, retailers get half of their joint profit with the
supplier.
4.2.2 Case {H,H}
In case of a breach in the bargaining betweenH and 1, H realizes a positive
profit with the other retailer 2. However, we have assumed that contracts are
negotiated simultaneously and secretly without ex-post observability of con-
tracts. While a pair (H, 1) negotiates, she considers the contract (wHH2 , T
HH
2 )
of the other pair’s negotiation and the quantity qHH2 chosen by the retailer 2
in stage 3 as given. Thus, the quantity outcome will be the Cournot equilib-
rium outcome and the upstream monopolist can not, through the contracting
have highlighted this vertical coordination problem in a price competition setting.
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stage, extends his monopoly power at the downstream level: this is the com-
mitment inefficiency raised in a secret contract setting.18
Solving the Nash program and from the symmetry between markets, in equi-
librium, wholesale prices are equal to the marginal cost of production. The
solution leads to the following result:
Lemma 7 When retailers compete in the same market and costs are convex,
retailers have a strictly higher share of their joint profits with their supplier
when they carry differentiated products.
Proof. See appendix 6.2.2
Again, we obtain the same result in an imperfect competition framework
than in the separated markets case.
4.3 Optimal listing choice
We now analyze the retailer 2 listing choice in the first stage of the game.
4.3.1 General result
The general solution of this stage is the same as in section 3 unless there is a
new reason to explain why 2 may carry L rather than H: Retailer 2 has here
the classical incentive to differentiate from 1 in order to relax downstream
competition. Let ΥHH2 (resp. Υ
HL
2 ) denote the joint profits realized by the
retailer 2 and the producer H (resp.L). The superscript “c” stands for com-
petition.
Lemma 8 When C ′′(q) > 0, there exists a quality level l
c
< 1 such that if
l = l
c
, ΥHL2 = Υ
HH
2 . There is a threshold l˜
c < l
c
such that when l[l˜c, 1], the
unique Nash equilibrium of the game is {H,L}.
18On the contrary, in a public contract setting, the producer could bargain with each
retailer over a two-part tariff contract such that they would share according to the ex-
ogenous bargaining in two equal parts half of the monopoly profit. A retailer wouldn’t
have any incentive to deviate in setting a higher quantity in stage 3 since it would earn a
strictly negative profit.
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Proof. see appendix 6.2. 3
From lemma 7 we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 9 Competing retailers may choose producer’s differentiation
only with the purpose to increase their buyer power.
Proof. From lemma 7, the proof is analogous to section 3.
All our results thus holds in a competition framework. In the interval of
quality level
[
l
c
, 1
]
the retailer now chooses to differentiate to reduce her
production cost, to improve her buyer power and to relax downstream com-
petition. In the interval [l˜c, l
c
] it is only the increase in buyer power through
producer’s differentiation that leads the retailer to carry the good L.
If we now turn to the effect on consumer surplus, the effects are much more
complex than in the separated markets case. Even if the two retailers carry
different products in order to increase their buyer power, it also reduces
downstream competition and thus may raise prices. Whereas market 1’s
consumers were always better off when 2 had chosen to carry L in the sepa-
rated markets case, it is now possible for retailer 1’s consumers to be worse
off because of the price rise. On the other hand, thanks to the competition,
a reduction in cost is more likely to be passed through to consumers than in
the case where markets were separated. Therefore, the effect on consumer
surplus could, on the contrary, be positive. We develop again an illustrative
example to further analyze the effects on consumer surplus.
4.3.2 Illustrative example
The illustrative example is the same as in the previous case. All details
of the calculations are provided in the appendix. We obtain the following
result:
Corollary 10 When retail competition is strong enough, the producer’s dif-
ferentiation has strictly positive effects on consumer surplus.
Proof. see appendix 6.2.4.
When retailers compete a` la Cournot, product differentiation has a strictly
fruitful influence on consumer surplus. Indeed, the pass through of a reduc-
tion in the production cost is higher when retailers compete than when they
20
had a monopoly position in separated markets. Thus, if cost are convex,
differentiation lowers the cost which benefits to consumers to a larger extent
than in the separated markets case. This shows that with convex cost, de-
spite of the reduction in competition they can expect, retailers are reluctant
to carry differentiated products when it would be profitable for consumers.
The intuition for this is twofold: (1) the retailer doesn’t capture all the ben-
efits induced by her choice to carry L since both her rival and the consumers
take a part of it; (2) this strategy allows the retailer to lower her cost, but also
provides the same competitive advantage to her rival which reduces directly
her profitability.
5 Conclusion
This article first highlights a new source of buyer power. Indeed, convexity
of costs (or capacity constraints) at the production level explains why larger
retailers have a greater buyer power towards producers (see Inderst and Wey
(2005)), but we prove here that it also guarantees that producer’s market
power increases with the number of his outlets. We thus show that pro-
ducer’s differentiation may be a source of buyer power for retailers. Second,
in a framework where manufacturers offer products differentiated in qual-
ity, this paper shows that retailers may choose to differentiate their product
lines with the only purpose to raise their buyer power. Indeed, a retailer
may have an incentive to supply towards a lower quality good manufacturer
because the latter will have in equilibrium a lower market power than the
high quality good manufacturer, due to a smaller number of outlets. This
article thus stems that a capacity constrained retailer may not always carry
the “best product” for consumers. However, when production costs are con-
vex, producers’ differentiation allows a retailer to lower the marginal cost and
the latter economies are partly passed through to consumers. When retail
competition is strong enough, consumers may rather benefit from producer’s
differentiation. These results would also hold, at least, when retailers are
in separated markets, if we had considered that the two manufacturers were
offering different varieties of a product rather than different qualities.19
19The insight is in a framework where consumers are uniformly distributed along a
linear city of length 1. One manufacturer offers a product whose characteristic is 1/2
while the other offers, for instance a good whose characteristic is 3/4. In this framework it
is straightforward that one of the retailers could have an interest to carry the 3/4 variety
21
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6 Appendices
6.1 Separated retail markets
6.1.1 Proof of Lemma 3
By definition, when l = 0, Υ̂L2 = 0. We then prove that if l = h, Υ̂
L
2 > Υ
H∗
2
in two steps as two changes are induced when 2 carries L rather than H.
(i) Assume that the marginal cost wH∗2 and optimal quantities q
H∗
2 are un-
changed, then, if l = h, the choice of L has a strictly beneficial effect
through the cost convexity. The cost reduction would simply be: −C(qH∗2 )+
C(2qH∗2 )/2 > 0. Thus, Υ̂
L
2
(
qH∗2
(
wH∗2
))
> ΥH∗2
(
qH∗2
(
wH∗2
))
.
(ii) When 2 carries L, the marginal cost is reduced from wH∗2 to ŵ
L
2 and
corresponding optimal quantities increase from qH∗2 to q̂
L
2 and we know that
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Υ̂L2
(
q̂L2
(
ŵL2
))
> Υ̂L2
(
qH∗2
(
wH∗2
))
since ŵL2 maximizes the vertically integrated
profits.
From (i) and (ii) we have proved that when l = h, ΥH∗2
(
qH∗2
(
wH∗2
))
<
Υ̂L2
(
q̂L2
(
ŵL2
))
.
6.1.2 Illustrative example
The formulae of the different thresholds are:
l˜ =
2 + c+
√
4 + 12c+ 21c2 + 16c3 + 4c4
4(1 + c)2
and
l =
1 +
√
1 + 2c+ 2c2
2(1 + c)
We do not give the explicit value of thresholds ls and ls2 since their expres-
sions are complex and not instructive. However, we easily prove that ls2 − l˜
strictly increases with c and that when c→∞, ls2− l˜→
√
2−1
2
The difference
l− l˜ also strictly increases with c and that when c→∞, l− l˜→
√
2−1
2
. Both
l˜ and ls strictly decrease in c. As c→∞, ls → 0 while l˜→ 1
2
. The difference
ls2 − l strictly decreases in c and ls2 − l→ 0 as c→∞ .
6.2 Retail Competition
6.2.1 Case {H,L}
Best response quantities are denoted qHLbr1 (.) and q
HLbr
2 (.).
We denote ΠHLi the manufacturer’s profit realized with the retailer i through
a contract (wHLi , T
HL
i ) who anticipates that the quantity q
HL
j set by her rival
j is given, where ΠHLi = w
HL
i q
HLbr
i +T
HL
i −C(qHLbri ). Moreover, the retailer
i’s profit is denoted piHLi =
(
P (qHLbri , q
HL
j )− wHLi
)
qHLbri − THLi . The equi-
librium two-part tariff contract (wHLi , T
HL
i ) is the solution of the following
Nash program
Max
wHLi ,T
HL
i
(ΠHLi )
1
2 (piHLi )
1
2 (8)
.
The equilibrium wholesale price is defined by the following implicit function
ŵHLi : w
HL
i =
∂C(qHLi )
qHLi
∣∣∣
qHLi =bqHLi (.)
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The equilibrium transfer is: T̂HLi =
1
2
P (q̂HLi )q̂
HL
i − ŵHLi q̂HLi + 12C(q̂HLi ).
6.2.2 Case {H,H}
Best response quantities are denoted qHHbr1 (.) and q
HHbr
2 (.). The Nash pro-
gram of the negotiation between H and i may be written as follows:
Max
wHHi ,T
HH
i
(ΠHHi+j − ΠHHi )
1
2 (piHHi )
1
2
where ΠKi+j = w
HH
i q
HHbr
i +T
HH
i +w
HH
j q
HH
j +T
HH
j −C(qHHbri +qHHj ), ΠHHi =
wHHj q
HH
j + T
HH
j −C(qHHj ) and piHHi =
(
PHH
(
qHHbri , q
HH
j
)− wHHi ) qHHbri −
THHi .
Solving the Nash program and from the symmetry between markets, in equi-
librium, wHH∗i = w
HH∗
j and q
HH∗
j = q
HH∗
i and the optimal input prices are
defined by the following implicit function :wHHi =
∂C(qHHi +q
HH
j )
qHHi
∣∣∣
qHHi =q
HH∗
i (.)
The equilibrium tariff is: THH∗i =
1
2
P (qHH∗i )q
HH∗
i −wHH∗i qHH∗i + 12(C(qHH∗i +
qHH∗j )− C(qHH∗i )).
6.2.3 Listing choice
As in the separated market case, when l = h, ΥHL2 > Υ
HH
2 and when l =
0,ΥHL2 = 0 < Υ
HH
2 . The facts that Υ
HL
2 increases in l and that Υ
HH
2 is
independent of l are thus sufficient to insure that there is a unique threshold
l
c
< 1 such that ΥHL2 = Υ
HH
2 .
This insures that in the interval [l˜c, l
c
] it is only the buyer power that explains
the incentives for retailer 2 to differentiate.
6.2.4 Illustrative example
The equilibrium outcomes in the case {H,L} are
q̂HL1 (.) =
2−l−2wHL1 +wHL2
4−l and q̂
HL
2 (.) =
l(1+wHL1 )−2wHL2
(4−l)l ;
ŵHL1 =
c2+cl(2−l)
2c+c2+4l+2cl−l2 and ŵ
HL
2 =
cl(1+c)
2c+c2+4l+2cl−l2 ;
T̂HL1 =
(2−c)(c+(2−l)l)2
4(c2+(4−l)l+2c(1+l))2 and T̂
HL
2 =
(1+c)2l2(2l−c)
4(c2+(4−l)l+2c(1+l))2 ;
piHL1 =
(2+c)(c+(2−l)l)2
4(c2+(4−l)l+2c(1+l))2 and pi
HL
2 =
(1+c)2l2(c+2l)
4(c2+(4−l)l+2c(1+l))2 ;
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ŜHL1 =
∫ 1eθ (θ − p̂HL1 ) dθ = (c+(2−l)l)(c+2cl2+l(2+l))c2+(4−l)l+2c(1+l) ;
ŜHL2 =
∫ eθbpHL2
l
(
θ − p̂HL2
)
dθ = (1+c)(c+2l)
c2+(4−l)l+2c(1+l) ;
ŜHL = ŜHL1 + Ŝ
HL
2 .
The equilibrium outcomes in the case {H,H} are
qHH∗1 (.) =
1−2wHH1 +wHH2
3
; qHH∗2 (.) =
1−2wHH2 +wHH1
3
;
wHH∗1 = w
HH∗
2 =
2c
3+2c
;
THH∗1 = T
HH∗
2 =
2−c
4(3+2c)2
;
piHH∗1 = pi
HH∗
2 =
(2+c)
4(3+2c)2
;
SHH∗ =
∫ 1
pHH∗
(
θ − pHH∗) dθ = 2
(3+2c)2
;
SHH∗1 = S
HH∗
2 =
SHH∗
2
.
All the thresholds derive immediately from the comparison between these
outcomes values.
Their expressions are nonetheless very complex so we simply give here some
basic results.20 The two thresholds lsc/SHH∗ = ŜHL and l˜c/piHH∗2 = pi
HL
2 are
such that lsc (0) = l˜c (0) = 0, and l˜c (c)− lsc (c) strictly increases in c, and
goes to 1
2
when c goes to infinity.
20The mathematica files are available from the authors by request.
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